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ENEMIES THROUGH THE GATES: RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA CONFLICT
Noelle M. Shanahan Cutts
A good neighbor is a fellow who smiles at you over the back fence, but 
doesn't climb over it.1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Soviet successor states are ripe for conflict, especially ethnic con-
flict, as their citizens “struggle over the redistribution of power.”3 The 1991 
disintegration of the Soviet Union into the Russian Federation and the So-
viet successor states resulted in numerous wars and ethnic conflicts, includ-
ing those in Nagorno-Karabakh, Trans-Dniester, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Ab-
khazia, and South Ossetia.4
After declaring independence from the Soviet Union, the Georgian 
government sent troops to the ethnically non-Georgian provinces of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia “rather than consider[ing] their demand for federali-
zation.”5 War broke out in both regions.  In 1992, South Ossetia declared 
itself independent from Georgia, intending to join North Ossetia to the Rus-
sian Republic.6 Ethnic Ossetians in South Ossetia established an “alternative 
3 Kim Lane Scheppele, “We Forgot About the Ditches:” Russian Constitutional Impatience 
and the Challenge of Terrorism, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 963, 1000 n.185 (2005). Some scholars 
say that there is “the potential for some 200 inter-ethnic conflicts and other conflicts in the 
former communist lands.” Terry McNeill, Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping in 
the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1997). 
4 Scheppele, supra note 3. Nagorno-Karabakh is a de facto independent republic, officially 
part of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Trans-Dniester is a territory within the internationally 
recognized boundaries of the Republic of Moldova. Tajikistan is a landlocked country in 
Central Asia. Chechnya is a Russian republic located in the Northern Caucasus Mountains. 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are both de facto independent regions of Georgia. Georgia (offi-
cially the Republic of Georgia from 1990–5) is situated in the South Caucasus between the 
Black Sea, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. 
5 Alexander N. Domrin, From Fragmentation to Balance: The Shifting Model of Federalism 
in Post-Soviet Russia, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 515, 519 (2006). 
6 Tarik Abdel-Monem, Patrick J.D. Kennedy & Ekaterina Apostolova, R (On the Applica-
tion of Al Skeini) v. Secretary of Defence: A Look at the United Kingdom’s Extraterritorial 
Obligations in Iraq and Beyond, 17 FLA. J. INT’L L. 345, 352 n.48 (2005). 
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government” and an alternative presidency in an attempt to break away 
from Georgia.7   
The war in Abkhazia, where the ethnic Abkhaz were a minority of 
the total population, was a result of Russia’s military interference on the 
side of the Abkhaz, which substantially improved Abkhazia’s bargaining 
position.8 Accordingly, Abkhazia was able to declare de facto9 indepen-
dence and set up its own government complete with a President, Parliament, 
and cabinet.10 While South Ossetia and Abkhazia are de facto independent, 
no other nation formally recognizes them,11 and the ethnic and political con-
flicts in those regions still endure after sixteen years.12 Grudgingly, both 
remain de jure parts of Georgia. 
Georgia blames Russia for the continuing Abkhazian conflict. Rus-
sia’s political, economic, and military support of the separatist government 
in Abkhazia prompted the Georgian Parliament’s July 17, 2006 resolution, 
“calling on the [Georgian] government to ‘start procedures . . . immediately 
to suspend [Russia’s] so-called peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia’ . . . , 
claiming that they ‘represent one of the major obstacles on the way to solve 
these conflicts peacefully.’”13 Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, a 
U.S.-educated lawyer, went even further, saying Abkhazia is “under a form 
of gangster occupation which hopes the international community will lose 
7 South Ossetia’s Other President, ARMENIAN NEWS BY A1+ ARMENIA, Feb. 10, 2007, 
http://www.a1plus.am/en/?page=issue&iid=45392. 
8 MONICA DUFFY TOFT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE: IDENTITY, INTERESTS, AND 
THE INDIVISIBILITY OF TERRITORY 88 (2003). 
9 De facto meaning “illegitimate but in effect.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th ed. 
2004).
10 E.K. Adzhindzhal, Abkhazia’s Liberation and International Law, OFFICIAL SITE OF THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ABKHAZIA, http://www.abkhaziagov.org/en/Liberty.php (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2007). 
11 South Ossetia’s Other President, supra note 7; Bernhard Gwertzman, Sestanovich: Rus-
sia-Georgia Spat “Part of a Much Bigger Confrontation,” COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Oct. 
4, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11602/sestanovich.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F3 
348%2Fbernard_gwertzman%3Fgroupby%3D0%26hide%3D3348%26page%3D1%26id%3
D3348%26page%3D6.   
12 While a discussion of whether or not Abkhazia and South Ossetia should, in fact, be rec-
ognized as independent nations is beyond the scope of this paper, scholars have suggested 
the creation of “a federal system, with extensive powers devolved to autonomous regions” 
saying that inspiration for such an arrangement can be drawn “from the experience of auto-
nomous regions in other countries, such as Cata Ionia in Spain, South Tyrol in Italy, and 
Greenland in Denmark.” David L. Phillips, Op-Ed., Power Sharing is the Way Forward for 
Georgia, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 16, 2004, at 15, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication 
/6943/powersharing_is_the_way_forward_for_georgia.html. 
13 INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ABKHAZIA: WAYS FORWARD, EUROPE REPORT N°179 14 (2007), 
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/179_abkhazia 
___ways_forward.pdf.  
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interest and reward the results of ethnic cleansing.”14 He continued: “[t]he 
painful, but factual truth is that these regions are being annexed to our 
neighbor to the north—the Russian Federation has actively supported their 
incorporation.”15 Georgia believes that Russia supports Abkhaz separatists 
as part of a larger Russian plan aimed at curtailing Georgian sovereignty.16
Georgia insists that it is necessary to replace the U.N.-sanctioned Com-
monwealth of Independent States’ (CIS)17 peacekeeping force in Abkhazia, 
comprised almost exclusively of Russian military, with another force that 
will be more neutral, effective, and results-oriented.18
In spite of this, there are those who accuse Georgia of shifting the 
blame to Russia for the continuing Georgia/Abkhazia conflict and the lack 
of a peaceful resolution. International Crisis Group (Crisis Group), an inde-
pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organization warns that “Georgians 
and Abkhaz have been living in parallel realities that are drifting further 
apart. . . . Unless they make a genuine effort to build on the progress that 
there has been in a few areas, 2007 will be a dangerous year.”19 The two 
views are as polarizing and confounding as the conflict itself. Nevertheless, 
an examination of the facts makes it clear that Russia has violated interna-
tional law in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict. 
With the hope of providing an impartial analysis, this paper will ad-
dress (1) how Russia’s “peacekeeping” and other activities in the Geor-
gia/Abkhazia conflict violate international law; (2) how these actions raise 
questions about the credibility and efficacy of joint U.N. peacekeeping mis-
14 Michael Mainville, Proud Abkhazia Fiercely Resists Pull Into Georgia's Orbit, S. F.
CHRONICLE, Sept. 24, 2006, at A20. 
15 Reuters AlertNet, Georgia Demands Removal of Russian “Peacekeepers,” REUTERS,
Sept. 22, 2006, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N22174158.htm. Senator John 
McCain has expressed concern that RF President Vladimir Putin is “trying to re-establish the 
Russian empire.” William Mulgrew, McCain Talk Possible Presidential Bid, More In Phila-
delphia Visit, BULLETIN, Dec. 4, 2006, http://theeveningbulletin.com/. 
16 Stephen Blank, Bracing for Conflict: Russia and Georgia in South Ossetia (A EurasiaNet 
Commentary), EURASIANET.ORG, Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/ 
insight/articles/eav092506a.shtml. Saakashvili cited Moscow’s support for separatists in 
South Ossetia as part of the same Russian plan aimed at curtailing Georgian sovereignty. Id.
Notwithstanding this, a discussion of Russia’s involvement in the somewhat analogous South 
Ossetia conflict is outside the boundaries of my discussion. 
17 At present, the CIS unites Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzs-
tan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. INT’L STAT.
COMM. OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEP. STATES, www.cisstat.com/eng/ (last visited Oct. 
28, 2007). 
18 Georgia considers replacing Russian peacekeepers with Ukrainians—Bezhuashvili,
INTERFAX, Feb. 13, 2007, http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/politics/28.html?id_issue=11676369. 
19 The Georgia/Abkhazia Conflict: Ways Forward, INT’L CRISIS GROUP, Jan. 18, 2007, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4619&1=1&m=1. 
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sions; and (3) what recourse, legal or otherwise, Georgia may have against 
Russia. 
Part two briefly explains the historical context of the relationship 
between the Russian Federation and Georgia. Part three explains the Geor-
gia/Abkhazia conflict and Russian involvement in peacekeeping missions, 
and addresses the response of the international community including the 
United Nations. Part four explores the relevant international law. Part five 
describes how Russian violations of international law in the Geor-
gia/Abkhazia conflict raise questions about the efficacy of U.N. joint peace-
keeping missions and why the U.N. should create a framework for engaging 
in joint peacekeeping missions with Russia. Part six examines Georgia’s 
possibilities for action against Russia. 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF GEORGIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA
Although the Republic of Georgia is a small nation of approximate-
ly five million people,20 its location between the Black Sea, Russia, Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey blesses (or curses) it with strategic importance 
far beyond its size.21 Former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze22
often said that Georgia is “the tastiest morsel of the former Soviet Union 
and the Russians want it back.”23
During the seventy years of Soviet occupation that began in March 
1921 when Georgia became part of the Soviet Union,24 “the Georgians 
maintained their unique alphabet and their particular interpretation of the 
Christian orthodox religion.”25 While not the case in many countries, Geor-
20 United States Central Intelligence Agency—The World Factbook—Georgia, Sept. 20, 
2007, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gg.html (last visited Oct. 07, 2007) 
[hereinafter CIA]. 
21 U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Geor.,
Sept. 2005, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5253.htm [hereinafter Dept. of State]. With a 
total area of approximately 69,700 sq. kilometers, Georgia is slightly smaller than the state of 
South Carolina. CIA, supra note 20. Russian interests in Georgia include: strategic borders, 
Black Sea access, land routes, economic interests, and military garrisons. See John Mackin-
lay & Evgenii Sharov, Russian Peacekeeping Operations in Georgia, in REGIONAL 
PEACEKEEPERS: THE PARADOX OF RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING, 69–70 (John Mackinlay & Peter 
Cross eds., 2003). 
22 Shevardnadze served as President of Georgia from 1995 until he resigned on Nov. 23, 
2003 in response to Georgia’s Rose Revolution. Prior to his presidency, he served under 
Mikhail Gorbachev as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 
1990. Shevardnadze, Eduard, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2007) available at 
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9067333. Georgia, in BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR, 2005
available at http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9398338.
23 Gwertzman, supra note 11. 
24 Dept. of State, supra note 21. 
25 Mackinlay & Sharov, supra note 21, at 64. 
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gia considered the Russian occupation “not so much a traumatizing cultural 
and political subordination as a continuation of an existing relationship of a 
protectorate state and its imperial master,”26 considering the fact that “[a]s 
early as 1773, Georgia acceded to the need for protection within the Russian 
Empire as an annexed state. . . .”27 However, during the occupation, the 
Soviet Union recognized “unique ethnic communities in Georgia, the South 
Ossetians [and] the Abkhazians, as ‘titular nations.’”28 Russia’s recognition 
of these communities foreshadowed the Georgia/South Ossetia and Geor-
gia/Abkhazia ethnic conflicts that continue today.29
Russian interest in the region remained strong during the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union.30 After the Supreme Council for the Republic of 
Georgia declared independence in April 199131—and during the ethnic con-
flicts that followed32—Russia sought a continued physical presence in 
Georgia that would allow it to maintain strategic borders,33 access the Black 
Sea34 and important land routes,35 pursue economic interests, and leave mili-
tary garrisons in place.36 Somewhat alarmingly, and allegedly because of 
these interests, Russian officials have tried to establish the Kosovo conflict37
as a precedent that would motivate the international community to endorse 
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 65. 
29 Id.
30 Id. at 68. 
31 Dept. of State, supra note 21. 
32 Mackinlay & Sharov, supra note 21, at 68. 
33 Id. at 69. 
34 Id. “After [Georgia declared independence in] 1991, Russia’s ability to control its strateg-
ic and economic interests in the Black Sea region were greatly diminished through both the 
geographic reductions in access to the Black Sea and the splitting of the Black Sea fleet. 
Russia’s presence in Abkhazia and the controlling instruments provided by the Russian garri-
son significantly increased their access beyond their internationally recognized Black Sea 
frontage.” Id.
35 Id. Access to land routes is extremely important; such access enables Russia to move large 
amounts of military logistics by road and rail. Id.
36 Id. at 70. 
37 Elena Guskova, a Russian academic and an expert on Balkans said it was too early to say 
what the Russian position on Kosovo might ultimately be. On one hand, Kosovo's indepen-
dence would grant the same rights to the people of Abkhazia. On the other hand, Kosovo’s 
independence could boost separatist movements in Russian republics such as Chechnya. 
Kosovo: Possible Russian U.N. Veto of Independence Buoys Serbia, ADNKRONOS INT’L, Sept. 
12, 2006, available at http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2006/September_13/1.html. 
Accordingly, Russia has expressed some concern about “Kosovo’s separatist aspirations.” 
Report: Serbia Counting on Russian, Chinese Veto to Block Kosovo Independence, Official 
Says, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 12, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/02/12/ 
europe/EU-GEN-Serbia-Kosovo.php.
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the breakaway efforts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, paving the way for a 
Russian land grab, or at least the creation of smaller nations more willing to 
“work” with Russia.38   
More recently, Russia has viewed the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipe-
line (the BTC winds its way through Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), 
a major route for delivery of oil from Kazakhstan to Europe,39 as a serious 
effort by the West to pry Georgia and all of Central Asia from Russia’s 
sphere of influence.40 Even the United States is worried that Russia has al-
lowed its interests to get in the way of a peaceful resolution to the Geor-
gia/Abkhazia conflict. The nonprofit Council on Foreign Relations advised 
President Bush in a policy paper: 
There is nothing legitimate about [Russia] limiting the opportunity of its 
neighbors [e.g., Georgia] to deepen their integration into the international 
economy, to choose security allies and partners, or to pursue democratic 
political transformation.41
Notably, the United States has strong interests in Georgia as well; 
therefore, its criticisms of Russia should be viewed accordingly. U.S. Presi-
dent George W. Bush has listed Georgia as an international terrorism tar-
get.42 In 2002, the U.S. military entered Georgia for limited missions when 
pro-independence Chechen troops infiltrated the Pankisi Gorge.43 In January 
2007, Georgian authorities and the CIA detained a Russian man who tried to 
sell weapons-grade uranium to undercover agents.44 In March 2007, Geor-
38 See Stephen Blank, Bracing for Conflict: Russia and Georgia in South Ossetia (A Eura-
siaNet Commentary), EURASIANET.ORG, Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org/ 
departments/insight/articles/eav092506a.shtml. 
39 See Catherine Dale, The Case of Abkhazia (Georgia), in PEACEKEEPING AND THE ROLE OF 
RUSS. IN EURASIA 121, 124 (Lena Jonson & Clive Archer eds., 1995).  
40 M. Ismail Khan, The Trans-Karakoram Oil Pipeline, THE NEWS, http://www.thenews. 
com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=30039 (last visited Oct. 1, 2007). “According to an assessment 
by U.S. Department of Energy, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan alone sit on more than 130 bil-
lion barrel oil, three times more than the United State's own reserves. Being a country where 
four per cent of the world’s population consumes about one-fourth of global energy output, it 
is but natural for the U.S. to keep a good calculation of the world’s oil wells. Besides, given 
the fast rate of resource depletion, and the chronic political uncertainties the Middle East 
continues to suffer, it is only prudent for the world to look for oil in remote places like the 
Caspian.” Id.
41 Robert McMahon, Russia Sanctions Georgia, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Oct. 4, 2006, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11566/russian_storm_clouds_over_georgia.html.
42 Jaba Devdariani, Georgia on a Fault Line, 8 ISCIP-PERSPECTIVE  (2002), http://www.bu. 
edu/iscip/vol13/Devdariani2.html. 
43 Associated Press, Green Berets Land in Georgia for 2-Year Training Program, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2002, at A2.  
44 See Moscow Lashes Out at Georgia at Uranium Sale Plot Thickens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 
2007, at A4. 
288 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:281 
gia announced that it would raise the number of its soldiers serving with the 
U.S.-led coalition in Iraq to more than 2,000. Georgia hopes that its willing-
ness to help in Iraq sends a strong message to NATO that it is ready to join 
the organization. Russia says that allowing Georgia to join NATO would 
seriously affect Russian security interests,45 saying that Georgia’s member-
ship in NATO could upset fragile stability in the Caucasus and hurt Russia's 
interests.46 Russia fears that Georgia’s NATO membership will create a 
slippery slope culminating in the entire region’s NATO membership. 
The United States and Georgia both have something to gain from 
close relations. Accordingly, Russia and the United States are engaged in a 
“soft power” duel in Georgia, “from economic and market influence, to 
democracy support and denial, to aggressive diplomacy—to create a region 
in their own image.”47 Nevertheless, Russia’s desire to create a region in its 
own image is no excuse for its violations of international law in the Geor-
gia/Abkhazia conflict. 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA CONFLICT
Abkhazia had the dubious honor of being the “playground of the 
Soviet elite” before the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991.48 Stalin, Khrush-
chev, and Gorbachev had luxurious summer residences along its Black Sea 
shores, and Soviet vacationers crowded its beaches, bringing with them 
their rubles and Soviet influences.49 Many locals like to say that when Cu-
ban President Fidel Castro met Khrushchev in Abkhazia, he raved that its 
beauty matched that of his homeland.50 Abkhazia remained an independent 
Soviet Socialist Republic until 1931, when it became an autonomous repub-
lic of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.51 It remained so during the 
Cold War. As the Soviet Union began to unravel, tension developed be-
tween Georgia and Abkhazia as the Abkhaz people began demanding the 
restoration of the region’s pre-1931 status and a return to what they viewed 
as the normalcy of autonomy.52
45 Paul Taylor, Georgia Demands Removal of Russian “Peacekeepers,” REUTERS, Sept. 22, 
2006, http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=N22174158. 
46 Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili, Provinces Spark War of Words, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 
26, 2006, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=18953. 
47 McMahon, supra note 41. 
48 Michael Mainville, Proud Abkhazia Fiercely Resists Pull into Georgia's Orbit, S. F.
CHRONICLE, Sept. 24, 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/ 
archive/2006/09/24/MNGSSLBNK81.DTL&type=politics. 
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Dept. of State, Fact Sheet: The Abkhazia Conflict, July 28, 2005, http://www.state.gov/ 
p/eur/rls/fs/53745.htm [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
52 Id.
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Abkhazia won de facto independence from Georgia in a 1992–1993 
war.53 During the war, both Georgia and Abkhazia:  
[S]howed reckless disregard for the protection of the civilian population, 
and [were] responsible for gross violations of international humanitarian 
law . . . Combatants both deliberately targeted and indiscriminately at-
tacked civilians and civilian structures, killing hundreds of civilians 
through bombing, shelling and rocket attacks. Combatants deployed and 
used major weapons in civilian areas, recklessly endangering peaceful res-
idents by situating legitimate military targets close to their homes. They 
also used weapons like the Grad rocket, although these were notoriously 
inaccurate. Troops on the ground terrorized the local population through 
house-to-house searches, and engaged in widespread looting and pillage 
[sic], stripping civilians of property and food.54
Georgia and Abkhazia negotiated several cease-fire agreements; but 
one or both sides would eventually breach the cease-fire, making it neces-
sary for the sides to negotiate a new agreement.55 When the July 1993 
cease-fire negotiated between Georgia and Abkhazia broke down, the Rus-
sian foreign ministry pressured Georgia and Abkhazia into negotiating 
another one. Notwithstanding this, “the Russian general staff had decided 
that the only way to resolve the conflict would be to remove all Georgian 
military forces from Abkhazia, and the Russian military mounted a surprise 
attack supporting the Abkhaz forces in taking Sukhumi and other lands.”56
At this time, President Shevardnadze “had to accept CIS membership and 
give permission for Russian forces to be stationed in Georgia.”57 It was a 
compromise that resounds to this day. 
Things proceeded swiftly from there.  In August 1993, the United 
Nations established the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) 
comprised of eighty-eight military observers to monitor compliance with the 
most recent cease-fire agreement.58 On March 24, 1994, the U.N. General 
Assembly granted observer status to the CIS forces already in the region.59
53 Evelyn Leopold, US, UK Object to Russia’s U.N. Proposal on Georgia, REUTERS, Sept. 
30, 2006, http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=N30263437. 
54 Human Rights Watch, Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia’s 
Role in the Conflict, 7 HUM. RTS. WATCH ARMS PROJECT 1, 5 (Mar. 1995), http://www.hrw. 
org/reports/pdfs/g/georgia/georgia953.pdf [hereinafter Human Rights Watch]. 
55 There were three ceasefires: September 3, 1992; July 28, 1993; and May 14, 1994. Unoffi-
cial Background Report, Peace and Sec. Section, Geor.—UNOMIG Background (2002),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomigB.htm.  
56 McNeill, supra note 3, at 102. 
57 Id.
58 Id. at 103; S.C. Res. 858 para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/858 (Aug. 24, 1993). Following the 
May 1994 ceasefire agreement, the Security Council authorized the increase in UNOMIG’s 
strength to up to 136 military observers. S.C. Res. 937, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/937 (July 
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On April 4, 1994, Georgia and Abkhazia signed a Declaration of 
Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict, and
committed themselves to strict observance of a cease-fire and to cooperate 
to ensure the safe, secure, and dignified return of people who had fled the 
area.60 A demilitarized security zone was created on either side of the Inguri 
River on May 14, 1994, when both sides signed the Agreement on a Cease-
Fire and Separation of Forces.61 The CIS62 deployed a 2,000-member 
peacekeeping force, comprised exclusively of Russian military, to this zone 
to monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement.63 The Russian peace-
keeper’s mandate said: 
The function of the [peacekeeping] force of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States shall be to exert its best efforts to maintain the cease-fire 
and to see that it is scrupulously observed. Further, its presence should 
promote the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, especially to the 
Gali region. It shall supervise the implementation of the Agreement and 
the Protocol thereto with regard to the security zone and the restricted-
weapons zone. In carrying out its mission, the force shall comply with lo-
cal laws and regulations and shall not impede the functioning of the local 
civil administration. It shall enjoy freedom of movement in the security 
zone and the restricted-weapons zone and freedom of communications, 
and other facilities needed to fulfill its mission.64
That the CIS sanctioned this peacekeeping mission gave it the ap-
pearance of legitimacy and something other than what it actually was: a 
purely unilateral Russian action devoid of any real U.N. influence.65 Within 
the CIS, however, there is a huge discrepancy between its stated principles66
21, 1994). Approximately nine years later, the Security Council authorized the addition of “a 
U.N. police component of 20 officers.” S.C. Res. 1494, para. 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1494 
(July 30, 2003). 
59 McNeill, supra note 3, at 103. 
60 Fact Sheet, supra note 51. The agreement was signed in Moscow. Id.
61 Id. The agreement was signed in Moscow as well. Id.
62 At present, the CIS unites Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzs-
tan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. INT’L STAT.
COMM. OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEP. STATES, supra note 17. 
63 See Fact Sheet, supra note 51. 
64 Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, Geor.-Abkhaz, Apr. 4, 1994, availa-
ble at http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/geo1.pdf.
65 In this and other conflicts, Russia “intervened both openly and covertly in the internation-
al affairs of its ex-republics, ostensibly for peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes, and has 
repeatedly sought international sanction via the U.N., OSCE, and CIS for its actions.” 
McNeill, supra note 3, at 97. 
66 The principles and purposes of the CIS are outlined in Articles I and II of the Charter of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States. The CIS “is based on the foundations of the 
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and the activities of Russia, its key member, which has continually flouted 
almost all of the CIS’s principles.67 The UNOMIG and CIS forces have 
parallel mandates, but the forces are independent from one another.68
A consensus emerged within Russia about its interests in the CIS 
space around the same time that the CIS deployed its peacekeeping force; 
Russia, as a regional superpower, believed it had a “special responsibility” 
to ensure order in the region.69 Russia believed it had a right and responsi-
bility to act as peacekeeper in the “near abroad” because: 
(1) Russia as the successor to the former Soviet Union has a special role to 
play in the region which it traditionally has ruled; (2) the territory of the 
former Soviet Union is a geostrategic space in which Russia has special in-
terests; (3) Russia has special responsibility for the security and well-being 
of Russian citizens, ethnic Russians, and Russian-speaking communities 
throughout the CIS; and (4) Russia as a great power has both regional and 
global responsibilities.70
Inevitably, problems arose as Russia’s idea of peacekeeping drasti-
cally departed from U.N. peacekeeping norms.71 Russian “peacekeeping” 
practice did not meet international standards; unlike the traditional approach 
of acting as impartial umpire between competing sides, Russian “peacekee-
equality of all of its members. The member states are independent and equal subjects of 
international law. The Commonwealth serves the further development and strengthening of 
relations of friendship, good neighborhood, international harmony, trust, mutual understand-
ing and mutually beneficial cooperation between member states. The Commonwealth is not a 
state and does not hold supranational powers.” CIS Charter, sec. I, art.1, Dec. 1991. Further-
more, the CIS’s purposes are as follows: “The realization of cooperation in political, eco-
nomic, environmental, humanitarian, cultural and other spheres; universal and balanced 
economic and social development of member states under the framework of common eco-
nomic space, interstate cooperation and integration; ensuring human rights and fundamental 
liberties in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law 
and documents of the CSCE; cooperation between member states to ensure international 
peace and security, the realization of effective measures for the reduction of arms and mili-
tary expenditures, the elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, 
and the achievement of universal and full disarmament; assisting citizens of member states in 
free interaction, contacts and movement in the Commonwealth; mutual legal assistance and 
cooperation in other spheres of legal relations; peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts 
between states of the Commonwealth.” Id. at art. 2. 
67 McNeill, supra note 3, at 98. Russia “has flouted almost all of the CIS’s principles in its 
bid to retrieve former economic, military and political hegemony over the former USSR.” Id.
68 Monthly Forecast, January 2006, SECURITY COUNCIL REP., Dec. 23, 2005, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SCR_ForecastJan06_Typeset.doc. 
69 See DOV LYNCH, RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPING STRATEGIES IN THE CIS: THE CASES OF 
MOLDOVA, GEORGIA AND TAJIKISTAN 9 (2000). 
70 McNeill, supra note 3, at 101. 
71 Id. at 98. 
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pers” are inserted to support one side over another72 and to “operate without 
a clear mandate, withdrawal timetable, or rules of engagement.”73 This has 
led to Russian “peacekeeping” being aptly described as “coercive diploma-
cy.”74
Russian peacekeepers did allow “the safe return of refugees and 
displaced persons[,]”75 and by 1998 tens of thousands of internally dis-
placed persons returned to their former homes, but escalating hostilities that 
same year culminated in a large-scale Abkhaz sweep operation, where at 
least 1,500 Georgian homes were reduced to ashes and at least 40,000 
Georgians were re-expelled. The U.N. Security Council (Security Council) 
condemned “the deliberate destruction of houses by Abkhaz forces, with the 
apparent motive of expelling people from their home areas.”76    
Thousands died because of the war and it forced at least 300,000 
ethnic Georgians from the region.77 Throughout the conflict, the Security 
Council issued resolutions “condemn[ing] any attempts to change the de-
mographic compilation of Abkhazia”78 in response to the vast changes in 
ethnic makeup caused by the conflict. Before the conflict began in 1992, 
Abkhaz represented around eighteen percent of the population in Abkhazia, 
and Georgians represented about fifty percent of the population.79 Georgia’s 
permanent representative to the United Nations says that genocide and eth-
nic cleansing took place during and after the 1992–1993 war with the result 
that today there are almost no ethnic Georgians left in Abkhazia.80
As the ethnic majority after the conflict, the resident Abkhaz set up 
their own government, complete with a president, parliament, and cabinet.81
Nevertheless, the Abkhaz victory has been purely Pyrrhic; no country in the 
72 Lynch, supra note 69, at 19–20, 24. For example, Russian support during the Nagorno-
Karabakh war remained officially neutral; however, both sides (Armenia and Azerbaijan) 
accused the Russian military of favoritism. Russia, in fact, provided support to Armenia. No 
Military Partnership with Azerbaijan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A26. 
73 See generally Lynch, supra note 69. The Russian military is unfamiliar with peacekeeping 
and regards it as a form of combat or a “war-fighting tool.” Id. at 100–01. 
74 See id. at 25–28.  
75 Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, supra note 64. 
76 S.C. Res. 1187, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1187 (July 30, 1998). 
77 S.C. Res. 896, U.N. Doc. S/RES/896 (Jan. 31, 1994). 
78 Id. at para. 12. 
79 Press Conference, Dept. of Pub. Info., Press Conference by Georgia (Jan.2, 2006), 
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2006/060201_Georgia.doc.htm [hereinafter Press 
Conference]. 
80 Id. According to Georgia’s permanent representative to the U.N., “[t]he ethnic cleansing 
that occurred there had been confirmed by the international community, and reflected in 
resolutions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during the 
1990s.” Id. 
81 Adzhindzhal, supra note 9. 
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world officially recognizes Abkhazia.82  To ameliorate this, Abkhazia has 
begun to lobby for regional recognition, starting with its closest ally. In Oc-
tober 2006—amid rising tensions between Russia and Georgia—Abkhazian 
“President” Sergei Bagapash, with the support of the Abkhaz “Parliament,” 
called on the Russian Federation to recognize Abkhazia’s independence, 
strengthening its campaign for international recognition. 83 In December 
2006, Abkhazia held a “national gathering” to “show its determination to 
gain full independence” from Georgia.84 Russia, however, has shown no 
sign of formally recognizing Abkhazia. It continues to address Abkhazia’s 
legal status in accordance with the principle of the territorial integrity of 
Georgia.
Nevertheless, Russia’s actions belie an ulterior motive. While Rus-
sia officially supports the territorial integrity of Georgia, what has taken 
place in Abkhazia is fundamentally different. In fact, it appears that Russia 
is engaged in a unique form of nation building. Trade in Abkhazia is con-
ducted in Russian rubles and the Abkhazian economy is tied to the Russian 
economy.85 Russia provides Abkhazia with practical support in the form of 
pensions and railway infrastructure.86 Russia has also provided Russian 
passports to a large number of Abkhazian citizens.87 Russian tourists flock 
to Abkhazia’s Black Sea beaches to the point that in 2005 income from 
tourism helped double the local budget to $35 million.88 Georgia accuses 
Russian banks in Abkhazia of money laundering.89   
82 Russia-Georgia: No Compromise on Army Bases Yet, RIA NOVOSTI, May 17, 2005, 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20050517/40370700.html. 
83 Anzhela Kuchuberia, Bagapsh Calls on Russia to Recognize its Independence, ITAR-TASS,
Oct. 18, 2006. Bagapsh said, “the [R]epublic should address the President of Russia and the 
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to recognize independence of the Republic of 
Abkhazia and establish associated relations between Russia and Abkhazia.” Id.; see also The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/15 (Jan. 11, 2007). 
84 Abkhazia to Hold ‘National Gathering’ for Independence, RIA NOVOTSI , June 12, 2006, 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20061206/56527550-print.html. 
85 Alisa Voznaya, Looking to Chechnya for Answers: How Abkhazia and Georgia Can 
Learn from Russian Lessons, BALKAN ANALYSIS, Aug. 29, 2006, http://www.balkanalysis. 
com/2006/08/29/looking-to-chechnya-for-answers-how-abkhazia-and-georgia-can-learn-
from-russian-lessons/.
86 Id.; Bruno Coppieters, The Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict, J. ON ETHNOPOLITICS AND 
MINORITY ISSUES IN EUROPE, ch. 5, § 2 (2004), available at http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/ 
download/1-2004Chapter5.pdf. 
87 Id. Russia was in the process of issuing Russian passports to Abkhazians in 2003. Id.
 88 Mainville, supra note 14. 
89 Press Conference, supra note 79; see also Michael Schwirtz, Criminal Gang Controlling 
Russian Banks is Exposed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2006/10/18/world/europe/18russiansumm.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
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Russia claims to act only as an arbitrator between the two factions, 
yet its territorial interests are exposed through both the amount of assistance 
its “peacekeepers” gave Abkhazia during the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict and 
the support it continues to provide to Abkhazia today.90 Georgia, mean-
while, attempts to distance itself politically and ideologically from Russia 
while keeping its piecemeal country intact and independent.   
IV. RUSSIA’S VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Peacekeepers Unauthorized to Provide Weapons or to Take Military 
Action
Peacekeepers are not authorized to provide military, financial, or 
logistical support to one side in a conflict,91 or to take military action against 
a party to the conflict.92 Furthermore, it is a violation of international law to 
provide training and military support to one side to an internal conflict, es-
pecially when that support comes from a peacekeeping force within the 
country.93
The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, in accordance with the 
U.N. Charter, provides that: 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting 
or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or ac-
quiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the 
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph 
involve a threat or use of force.94
The Declaration further provides that “no State shall organize, assist, fo-
ment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities di-
rected towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or inter-
fere in civil strife in another State.”95 In Nicaragua v. United States of 
America, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) made it clear that the prin-
90 Voznaya, supra note 85. 
91 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 
I.C.J. 116, 101 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities], available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2007). On December 19, 2006, the 
International Court of Justice held that Uganda violated Congo’s sovereignty by invading it, 
occupying territory in Ituri, and providing military, financial, and logistical support to anti-
Kabila Congolese rebels within the country between 1998 and 2002. Id. 
92 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 307–08 (4th ed. 2005). 
93 Armed Activities, supra note 91, at 56. 
94 G.A. Res. 2625 at 123, U.N. GAOR, 25 Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 
1970).
95 Id.
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ciple of non-intervention prohibits a State “to intervene, directly or indirect-
ly, with or without armed force, in support of an internal opposition in 
another State.”96 In Congo v. Uganda, the ICJ noted that acts which breach 
the principle of non-intervention “will also, if they directly or indirectly 
involve the use of force, constitute a breach of the principle of non-use of 
force in international relations.”97 “These provisions are declaratory of cus-
tomary international law.”98
Russia says it is an independent broker fielding peacekeeping mis-
sions and its representatives have publicly said they recognize the territorial 
integrity of Georgia.99 The Georgian Parliament contends, however, that 
Russia was “directly involved in the initiation of conflicts in Abkhazia . . . 
in [the] early 90s, first through an intensive delivery of arms to conflicting 
sides, and later through direct participation of its military personnel serving 
in Gudauta military base in military actions against Georgia.”100 In fact, 
Security Council Resolution 876 “calls on all states to prevent the provision 
from their territories or by persons under their jurisdiction of all assistance . 
. . to the Abkhaz side and in particular to prevent the supply of any weapons 
and munitions.”101 This raises the question of whether any state or other 
entity was providing weapons to either side. 
Human Rights Watch concluded that the “sudden presence of ar-
mor, tanks, and heavy artillery among the previously lightly armed Abkhaz 
in the fighting between October and December 1992 realistically leaves 
little room for any conclusion except that some parties, within the Russian 
forces, decided to supply the Abkhaz.”102 Russia escalated human rights 
abuses by making “available weapons to groups or individuals known or 
likely to use them to commit atrocities.”103 Russia’s provision of weapons to 
the Abkhaz was in violation of international law. Furthermore, Russia inter-
vened in armed conflict within Georgia. 
The Abkhaz, with the assistance of Russian military vessels and lo-
gistics, launched three major assaults on Sukhumi in which there were a 
number of civilian deaths.104 Some Russian-trained and Russian-paid figh-
ters defended Abkhaz territory; there were also a variety of freelance figh-
96 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108 (June 27, 1986). 
97 Armed Activities, supra note 91, at 56. 
98 Id.
99 McMahon, supra note 41. 
100 Parliament of Georgia, Some Facts of Russian Policy Towards Georgia,
http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=63&info_id=13323 (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2007). 
101 S.C. Res. 876, para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/876 (Oct. 19, 1993). 
102 Human Rights Watch, supra note 54, at 32.
103 Id. at 6. 
104 Id. at 7. 
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ters, including Cossacks.105 Nonetheless, Human Rights Watch determined 
that “Russian government officials . . . sanctioned the sending of Russian 
fighters to Abkhazia as agents of the Russian Federation.”106 Therefore, 
Russia intervened in support of an internal opposition within a state. Under 
Nicaragua and Congo, Russia’s intervention on behalf of the Abkhaz vi-
olates international law. 
B.  Civilians are Unlawful Targets  
The Geneva Conventions apply to armed conflicts that are interna-
tional in nature. In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia held that “an armed conflict exists whenever 
there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups in a State.”107 Furthermore, an armed conflict within a State’s 
borders is international if “the troops of another State intervene in the con-
flict and even where some participants in the internal armed conflict act on 
behalf of this other State.”108
For the purposes of international humanitarian law, a person is a ci-
vilian if he or she is not a member of the armed forces.109 The parties to a 
conflict have the duty to protect and respect civilians pursuant to customary 
international law.110 This concept is also codified in Geneva Convention IV, 
Article 27, paragraph 1. 
Furthermore, it is customary international law that “the conduct of 
any organ of a State . . . be regarded as an act of that State.”111 War crimes 
cover even “isolated acts committed by individual soldiers acting without 
direction or guidance from higher up.”112 For example, the ICJ held in Con-
go v. Uganda that the conduct of individual soldiers and officers of the 
Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) was the conduct of a State or-
gan.113 The court said that by virtue of their military status, the UPDF’s 
105 Id. at 7. 
106 Id. at 52. 
107 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Oct. 2, 1995). 
108 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 59 
(2nd ed. 2004). 
109 THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 210 (Dieter Fleck ed., 
2003).
110 See id. at 502. 
111 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 87 (Apr. 29). 
112 Schabas, supra note 108, at 55.  
113 Armed Activities, supra note 91, para. 213.  
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conduct was attributable to Uganda.114 The Court did not accept Uganda’s 
argument that those individuals within the UPDF “did not act in the capaci-
ty of persons exercising governmental authority in the particular circums-
tances.”115 It is customary international law that a party to an armed conflict 
shall be responsible for all acts by persons forming part of its armed forces. 
This is reflected in Article 3 of the Fourth Hague Convention respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907116 and in Article 91 of Protocol 
I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.117
Early Security Council resolutions regarding the Georgia/Abkhazia 
conflict referred to Russia as a “facilitator of peace.” Yet, Russian soldiers 
“carried out a large number of attacks against Georgian targets, which re-
sulted in civilian casualties.”118 Russian planes attacked Sukhumi on Febru-
ary 20, 1993, followed by other air raids.119 While the Russian defense min-
istry contended that the “Georgians are bombing themselves,” the evidence 
strongly indicates that the attacks were carried out by Russian forces.120 In 
fact, Georgian forces succeeded in downing an SU-27 fighter-bomber that 
was raiding Sukhumi on March 19, 1993. Upon inspection, a U.N. military 
observer confirmed that the aircraft was Russian and the pilot was a major 
in the Russian air force.121
Because Russia intervened in the conflict and at least some Rus-
sians acted on behalf of Abkhazia, the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict is interna-
tional in nature. Accordingly, the Geneva Conventions apply. Russia should 
be held responsible for the actions of individual active-duty members of 
Russia’s armed or security forces in Abkhazia. Pursuant to international 
law, Russia is responsible for its peacekeeping forces’ slaughter of Georgian 
civilians.
Coming to its own defense, Russia professes to play a humanitarian 
and pacifying role, saying that if Russian peacekeepers were “not present, 
114 Id.
115 Id. 
116 “A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the 
case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed 
by persons forming part of its armed forces.” The Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land ch. 1, art. 3, October 18, 1907, 1 Malloy 2269. 
117 “A Party to the conflict . . . shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons form-
ing part of its armed forces.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 
art. 91, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 45. 
118 Human Rights Watch, supra note 54, at 6. 
119 Id. at 37. 
120 Id. at 37–38 (quoting Thomas Goltz, Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand, 92 
FOREIGN POLICY 107 (1993)).
121 Id. at 38. 
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the Abkhaz would be doomed.”122 Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov 
contends that the peacekeepers are “the principal restraining force in the 
region.”123 While it is arguable that peacekeepers are necessary to prevent 
the Georgians or Abkhaz from committing atrocities, Russian peacekeepers 
have engaged in the conflict and murdered civilians—hardly the ideal role 
for facilitators of peace. Protecting the Abkhaz does not give Russian 
peacekeepers carte blanch to launch attacks against Georgian civilians who 
are not themselves engaged in the conflict. In fact, Russian peacekeepers are 
meant to prevent the escalation of the conflict and to protect Georgians and 
Abkhaz alike.124
C. Russia Violated Georgia’s Sovereignty 
Pursuant to international law, a state has “sovereignty over its terri-
tory.”125 The development of a system of sovereign states culminated at the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and conceptions of a modern sovereign state 
were introduced into the political realm by the writings of Machiavelli, 
Luther, Bodin, and Hobbes. 126 While some scholars doubt whether a stable 
notion of sovereignty exists, there is a definition of what sovereignty came 
to mean in early modern Europe, of which most subsequent definitions are a 
variant: supreme authority within a territory.127 Black’s Law Dictionary 
adopts the ‘Westphalian Model’ of sovereignty, defining it as “supreme 
dominion, authority, or rule.” This model, also recognized by the United 
Nations in its Charter,128 asserts that all sovereigns are equal and exercise 
power within their own territory.129 The U.N. Charter recognizes a sove-
reign state’s right “to regulate its territory and nationals.” While a nation’s 
right to sovereignty is not without its limits, sovereignty is of paramount 
concern in international law. 
122 INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ABKHAZIA TODAY, EUR. REPORT N°176 7 (2006), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/176_abkhazia_today.pdf. 
123 Id.
124 Recall the April 4, 1994, Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces which said 
that the Russian peacekeepers were there in order to maintain the ceasefire. See Agreement 
on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, supra note 64. 
125 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 206 (1987). 
126 Dan Philpott, Sovereignty, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/. 
127 Id.
128 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
129 See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 5 (2005). 
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In Congo v. Uganda, the ICJ held that “the unlawful military inter-
vention by Uganda was of such a magnitude and duration” that it was a 
grave violation of the U.N. Charter’s prohibition of force.130 While Russian 
peacekeepers intervened in Georgia with the consent of Georgian officials, 
and were subsequently endorsed by the Security Council as members of a 
joint peacekeeping mission, the intervention has lasted more than thirteen 
years. The results of Russian action have been devastating, with Russian 
peacekeepers responsible for a number of civilian deaths. Accordingly, Rus-
sia’s actions constitute an excessive use of force and a violation of Geor-
gia’s right to sovereignty. Furthermore, in Congo v. Uganda, the ICJ held: 
If a State assumes an obligation in an international agreement to respect 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other States parties to that 
agreement . . . and a commitment to co-operate with them in order to fulfill 
such obligation, this expresses a clear legally binding undertaking that it 
will not repeat any wrongful acts.131
Russia officially respects the territorial integrity of Georgia; the Se-
curity Council, of which Russia is a permanent member, respects the terri-
torial integrity of Georgia. Security Council resolutions are binding on U.N. 
Member States.  Accordingly, Russia is legally obligated to respect the terri-
torial integrity of Georgia. Russia’s disrespect for the territorial integrity of 
Georgia subsequent to such Security Council resolutions just adds fuel to 
the fire. Russia’s behavior in this context is little different than a schoolyard 
bully that believes it, as the regional superpower, may act in any manner it 
deems desirable, despite international law to the contrary.  
D. Provision of Russian Passports 
The issuance of Russian passports to seventy to ninety percent of 
Abkhazians (otherwise Georgian citizens) since 2003 gives the impression 
that Abkhazia is a Russian protectorate. 132 Georgian officials say that this 
cannot be viewed as anything but an attempt to annex Abkhazia.133 They 
also ask two important questions: (1) “can Russia be an unbiased facilitator 
130 Armed Activities, supra note 91, at para. 165. 
131 Id. at para. 257.  
132 Georgia Update, EUROPEAN FORUM, Sept. 1, 2005, http://www.europeanforum.net/ 
coun.try/georgia; Tom Parfitt, Georgia Up in Arms Over Olympic Clash, GUARDIAN 
UNLIMITED, Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2143104,00.html. 
Abkhazians rushed to acquire Russian passports before citizenship regulations tightened in 
2002. Abkhaz Rush for Russian Passports, INST. OF WAR AND PEACE REPORTING, June 27, 
2002, http://iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=160553&apc_state=henicrs2002.  
133 Georgia's Key Foreign Policy Challenges (CSIS Georgia Forum Notes), EMBASSY OF 
GEORGIA, Dec. 4, 2002, http://www.georgiaemb.org/DisplayDoc.asp?id=77; see also INT’L
CRISIS GROUP, supra note 13, at 5. 
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in the [Georgia/Abkhazia] conflict if a majority of the residents of [the Ab-
khazian] side are Russian citizens?” and (2) will there ever be a situation 
where Russia will justify greater involvement in the Georgia/Abkhazia con-
flict as necessary to protect its citizens?134 While it is the Russian govern-
ment and not the Russian peacekeepers issuing Russian passports, the Rus-
sian government’s decision to issue passports to the Abkhaz clearly demon-
strates its bias in the conflict. 
Abkhaz law allows dual Russian-Abkhaz citizenship but not dual 
Georgian-Abkhaz citizenship Black’s Law Dictionary describes a passport 
as “a formal document certifying a person’s identity and citizenship so that 
the person may travel to and from a foreign country.” While the issue of an 
authentic passport (there is a large market for counterfeit.135 Russian pass-
port holders are entitled to Russian pensions of about fifty dollars a 
month136 and social security payments—both considerably higher than in 
Georgia. 137 In addition, many Abkhaz engage in small-scale smuggling to 
Russia and find a Russian passport necessary to their business.138 Ethnic 
Georgians living in Abkhazia must obtain Russian passports if they wish to 
travel abroad, vote, or participate in the political process.139 Georgian pass-
port holders are denied Russian visas,140 and most travelers wishing to enter 
Russia from Georgia without a Russian passport must do so via a third 
country.141
Black’s Law Dictionary describes a passport as “a formal document 
certifying a person’s identity and citizenship so that the person may travel to 
and from a foreign country.” While the issue of an authentic passport (there 
is a large market for counterfeit passports) “raises no more than a presump-
tion that the holder is a national of the state of issue, [] the presumption is 
not easily rebutted.”142 Some scholars posit that a passport is, in fact, evi-
134 Georgia's Key Foreign Policy Challenges, supra note 133. 
135 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices in Georgia, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, March 8, 2006, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61649.htm [hereinafter Bureau of Democracy]. 
136 Daan van der Schriek, South Ossetia Gets Ultimatum, Rejects Georgian Aid,
EURASIANET, June 23, 2004, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/ 
eav062304.shtml. 
137 Ahto Lobjakas, Georgia Walking a Tightrope Toward the West, RADIO FREE
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, Nov. 24, 2006, http://rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/11/e709c840-
fcb4-4d7f-a69e-52331e23683a.html. 
138 Id.
139 Bureau of Democracy, supra note 135; INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ABKHAZIA TODAY, EUROPE 
REPORT No176, Sept. 15, 2006, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/ 
europe/caucasus/176_abkhazia_today.pdf. 
140 Lobjakas, supra note 137. 
141 See Bureau of Democracy, supra note 135. 
142 ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 181 (2005). 
2007–2008] ENEMIES THROUGH THE GATES 301
dence of nationality.143 A passport entitles the holder to the protection and 
assistance of the holder’s diplomatic and consular officers abroad.144 Mem-
bers of the Russian Duma make frequent statements emphasizing that ethnic 
Abkhaz with Russian passports are their citizens;145 as Russian citizens, 
they are entitled to Russia’s protection as stipulated in the Russian Federa-
tion Constitution.146 In July 2006, the Russian Duma passed a resolution 
authorizing Russian troops to serve anywhere in the defense of Russian citi-
zens—presumably including those who reside permanently in Abkhazia.147
The chairperson of the State Duma International Affairs Committee said 
that Russia would use “all means at [Russia’s] disposal” to protect Russian 
passport holders in Abkhazia, including the military in extreme cases.148
While a country is free to establish its own rules and regulations regarding 
passports, Russia’s claim that it is justified in protecting all Russian pass-
port holders raises serious questions of international law. 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits Members from using 
force against other nations, subject to two exceptions. First, Members may 
use force when the Security Council authorizes a Member to use force 
against another. Second, Members are able to act in self-defense against an 
armed attack. The Charter states: “[n]othing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” Although the text of 
U.N. Charter Article 51 does not appear to allow the use of force until 
another nation physically launches its attack, many have argued that Article 
51 permits “anticipatory” self-defense in the event of an imminent and 
overwhelming threat. The Russian officials’ rhetoric does not appear to in-
voke the first exception, as officials have said nothing about asking the Se-
curity Council for permission to use force. If Russia asked for the Security 
Council’s permission to use force against Georgia, it would be unlikely to 
succeed, as the United States would probably exercise its veto power. Ac-
cordingly, it appears as if Russian officials are hearkening to the second 
exception, which allows for self-defense against an imminent armed attack. 
Concurrently, however, the Russians are redefining what constitutes an 
armed attack against Russia. By their own words, an armed attack against 
143 BURDICK H. BRITTIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS 183 (4th ed., 1981). 
144 Id.
145 See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 13, at 15. 
146 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federastii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 61, translated in 
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm. (“The Russian Federation shall guarantee to 
its citizens protection and patronage abroad.”).  
147 See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 13, at 15. 
148 Notes from Briefing by Konstantin Kosachev Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Chair-
man, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE G8 PRESIDENCY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN 2006, July 
16, 2006, http://en.g8russia.ru/news/20060716/1226699.html. 
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Abkhazia is re-characterized as an armed attack on Russia. If the Georgian 
government tries to reassert control over Abkhazia, Russian officials believe 
that Russia is justified in engaging its military to protect the substantial 
number of Abkhaz who hold Russian passports. This is not the rhetoric of 
neutral peacekeepers.  
Furthermore, the Russian practice of issuing Russian passports to 
Abkhaz could create a strange situation for other countries. The European 
Union has agreed to ease its visa rules for Russians, but not Georgians. Ac-
cordingly, Georgians could find it more difficult to visit the European Un-
ion than Abkhaz carrying Russian passports.149 One solution is for the Eu-
ropean Union not to recognize Abkhazian’s Russian passports “‘as having 
the same validity as those Russian passport holders who are resident in the 
territory of the Russian Federation.’”150
E.  Withdrawal of Consent 
Peacekeeping forces, whether or not they derive their mandate from 
the Security Council, are usually established and maintained with the con-
sent of all States concerned.151 Generally, the withdrawal of consent by a 
host State terminates a peacekeeping operation.152 No particular formalities 
are required for the withdrawal of consent.153 Nevertheless, the United Na-
tions Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) parted from this rule with 
Resolution 689 (1991) declaring, “[t]he deployment of UNIKOM ‘can only 
be terminated by a decision of the [Security] Council.’”154
Initially, both Georgia and Abkhazia consented to Russia’s in-
volvement as a peacekeeper, although there is an argument that Russia 
coerced Georgia’s consent. When the July 1993 cease-fire negotiated be-
tween Georgia, Abkhazia, and Russia broke down, the Russian foreign min-
istry pressured the sides into negotiating with one another. Regardless of 
this, “the Russian general staff had decided that the only way to resolve the 
conflict would be to remove all Georgian military forces from Abkhazia, 
and the Russian military mounted a surprise attack supporting the Abkhaz 
forces in taking Sukhumi and other lands.”155 At this time, President She-
vardnadze “had to accept CIS membership and give permission for Russian 
149 Lobjakas, supra note 137. 
150 Id.
151 DINSTEIN, supra note 92, at 309. 
152 Id. at 308. 
153 Armed Activities, supra note 91, para. 51 (noting, “no particular formalities would have 
been required for the [Democratic Republic of Congo] to withdraw its consent to the pres-
ence of Ugandan troops on its soil.”). 
154 DINSTEIN, supra note 92, at 308. 
155 McNeill, supra note 3, at 102. 
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forces to be stationed in Georgia.”156 Georgia consented to the presence of 
Russian peacekeepers in the March 3, 1994 Declaration on Measures for A 
Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict.157 The Declaration 
states, “[t]he parties reaffirm their request for the early development of a 
peacekeeping operation and for the participation of a Russian military con-
tingent in the United Nations peacekeeping force. . . .”158 Georgia consented 
to the presence of a Russian force so long as it was engaged in peacekeep-
ing operations. Furthermore, Georgia consented to a “Russian military con-
tingent in the United Nations peacekeeping force,” suggesting that Georgia 
consented to a Russian military contingent that it expected to comply with 
United Nations peacekeeping norms.159 Moreover, Georgia acquiesced to a 
multinational peacekeeping force, and not a force comprised solely of Rus-
sian soldiers. Accordingly, Georgia’s consent was not open-ended but was 
limited by the Declaration.160
In October 2005, the Georgian Parliament issued a resolution set-
ting deadlines for either corrective measures or termination of Russian 
“peacekeeping” and “mediating” activities in Abkhazia.161 In July 2006, the 
Georgian Parliament issued a resolution resolving to “entrust the Govern-
ment of Georgia with a task to launch necessary procedures to immediately 
suspend the so-called peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia . . . and to im-
mediately withdraw the armed forces of the Russian Federation from the 
territory of Georgia.”162
156 McNeill, supra note 3, at 102. 
157 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in 
Abkhazia, Georgia, Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict,
Ann., para. 4, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
S/1994/253 (Mar. 3, 1994) [hereinafter Measures for a Political Settlement of Geor-
gian/Abkhaz Conflict].  
158 Id. at para. 4 (emphasis added). 
159 Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict, supra note 157, at 
para. 4 (emphasis added). As mentioned previously, a U.N. peacekeeping force never really 
arrived; rather the U.N. dispatched a few unarmed observers.  
160 See Armed Activities, supra note 91, at para. 52 (drawing “attention to the fact that the 
consent that had been given to Uganda to place its forces in the DRC, and to engage in mili-
tary operations, was not an open-ended consent” but was limited by agreement). 
161 Vladimir Socor, Georgia on Russian “Peacekeeping:” Enough is Enough, EURASIA—
DAILY MONITOR, Oct. 6, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id= 
407&issue_id=3483&article_id=2370307. The Georgian Parliament issued a second resolu-
tion on February 15, 2006. Jean-Christophe Peuch, Georgia: Parliament Votes Russian 
Troops Out of South Ossetia, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, Feb. 15, 2006, 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/d3bdf92d-c942-4b1a-a4fa-fdd85a849a8.html.  
162 Res. of the Parliament of Geor. on the Peacekeeping Forces Located on the Territory of 
Geor., Res. N 3483-rs, (July 18, 2006), available at http://www.parliament.ge/index.php? 
lang_id=ENG&sec_id=98&info_id=13089. 
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In November 2006, weekly quadripartite meetings between Geor-
gia, Abkhazia, UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force to discuss issues 
in the conflict zone were suspended following the resignation of the Geor-
gian Coordinator.163 Georgia has not appointed a new Coordinator but rather 
“expressed its reservations about the effectiveness of the existing quadripar-
tite meeting and [] raised the issue of a possible change in its format.”164
After years of unresolved or “frozen conflict” with Abkhazia, Georgian 
President Saaskashvili told the U.N. “[i]t is a well settled and universally 
accepted law that Georgia has the sovereign right to request the removal of 
[Russian] military forces that impede the peaceful resolution to conflict.”165
Yet, Russian peacekeepers remain in Georgia despite the Georgian Parlia-
ment’s resolutions and Saakashvili’s statements to the United Nations. In 
light of the fact that there are no formal requirements for the withdrawal of 
consent pursuant to international law, and there is no U.N. resolution requir-
ing the Security Council’s decision to effect a withdrawal, Georgia can ar-
gue that Russian peacekeepers remain there in violation of international law. 
V.  QUESTIONING THE EFFICACY OF U.N. JOINT PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
Russia’s violations of international law in the Georgia/Abkhazia 
conflict raise questions about the efficacy of United Nations joint peace-
keeping missions. The United Nations defines peacekeeping as “a way to 
help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace.”166
After the Cold War, there was “a shift toward the acceptance of collective 
intervention for humanitarian purposes in internal conflicts.”167 The U.N. 
Charter authorizes the Security Council to take collective action to maintain 
international peace and security by authorizing peacekeeping operations.168
Article 52(1) states: 
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional ar-
rangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the main-
tenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional 
action if such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent 
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 
163 Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, supra note 83, at 
para. 26. 
164 Id.
165 Paul Taylor, Georgia Demands Removal of Russian “Peacekeepers,” REUTERS, Sept. 22, 
2006, http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=N22174158. 
166 U.N. Peacekeeping—FAQ—Meeting New Challenges, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ 
dpko/faq/q1.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007). 
167 Binaifer Nowrojee, Joining Forces: United Nations and Regional Peacekeeping—
Lessons from Liberia, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 129, 129 (1995). 
168 U.N. Charter art. 42, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm.  
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Whether such regional action requires Security Council approval is the sub-
ject of great debate.169 Article 53(1) states, “[n]o enforcement action shall be 
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the au-
thorization of the Security Council.” However, it is arguable that Article 
52(1) allows regional interventions not authorized by the Security Council 
so long as they are consistent with “the Purposes and Principles of the 
[United Nations].”170 Nevertheless, the legitimacy of unauthorized interven-
tions is often called into question.171
Where direct U.N. involvement is not considered appropriate or 
feasible, the Security Council may give its authorization to regional or other 
international organizations or “coalitions of willing countries” to implement 
certain peacekeeping or peace enforcement functions. Such cooperative 
arrangements are desirable in that they allow the United Nations to share the 
diplomatic and economic burden of peacekeeping with other entities.172
Regional peacekeeping arrangements, however, are not without their draw-
backs.173 In 1994, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gali recognized 
some of the dangers of regional peacekeeping. He said that regional peace-
keeping involves problems of (1) command and coordination, (2) simulta-
neously fielding successful multiple operations by multiple actors, (3) the 
changing nature of conflict, and (4) the “new regionalism.”174 While recog-
nizing the possibility for regional peacekeepers to “enhance the effective-
ness” of U.N. peacekeeping capacities, Boutros-Gali warned that regional 
involvement might also carry with it certain dangers, as “[t]hose close to a 
problem and well equipped to handle it may also be too close to its living 
historical associations: in short, regional involvement may raise the old 
fears of regional hegemony and intervention.”175 These problems plagued 
the joint peacekeeping initiative of the U.N. Observer Mission in Liberia 
169 See generally Christine Gray, A Crisis of Legitimacy for the U.N. Collective Security 
System?, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 157, 157 (2007) (stating that the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq 
has challenged the “legitimacy of [the U.N.] collective security system”). 
170 Nowrojee, supra note 167, at 131–32. 
171 Thomas M. Franck, Essays in Honor of Oscar Schachter: Humanitarian and Other Inter-
vention, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 321, 325 (2005). Though interventions not authorized 
by the Security Council may be forgiven later (e.g., ECOWAS in Sierra Leone and NATO in 
Kosovo). Id.
172 McNeill, supra note 3, at 96. 
173 U.N. peacekeeping operations in general are not without their drawbacks.  For example, 
there were U.N. peacekeeping forces on the ground in Rwanda when genocide took place. 
William Schabas, The Genocide Convention at Fifty, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Special Report) 
41 (Jan. 7, 1999) http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990107.html; see also, Shamed 
are the Peacekeepers, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 1994, at 15. 
174 Boutros Boutros-Gali, Op-Ed., Beleaguered are the Peacekeepers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 
1994, at E15. 
175 Id.
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(UNOMIL) and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which began in 
1993.176 These same problems plague the joint peacekeeping initiative of 
the UNOMIG and CIS, where Russia’s involvement in the Geor-
gia/Abkhazia conflict is relatively unchecked by the United Nations and has 
resulted in numerous violations of international law. 
Without an effective framework for joint peacekeeping missions, 
the United Nations entered into a relationship with Russia whereby Russia 
was privy to U.N. monies, but also able to focus on its own interests, and 
arguably, perpetuate and prolong the conflict. As mentioned previously, the 
UNOMIG and CIS mandates are parallel but independent. Furthermore, 
Russia has been in the lead on issues related to UNOMIG for the duration of 
its operation.177 In fact, Russian peacekeepers violated international law by 
providing weapons and engaging in military action against Georgia and 
murdering Georgian civilians. Additionally, Russia engaged in practices, 
such as the preferential distribution of passports to Abkhaz, in contravention 
of the expectation that peacekeepers are neutral; these and other Russian 
actions raise significant questions of international law. Finally, Georgia 
effectively withdrew its consent to Russian peacekeeping. Nonetheless, the 
joint peacekeeping endeavor continues, and some members of the Security 
Council have only recently begun to raise questions about the wisdom of 
allowing Russia to continue in its peacekeeping role.178
VI. GEORGIA’S POSSIBLE RECOURSE
Georgia has several options for action against Russia. Georgia can 
“communicate” with the International Criminal Court (ICC), request that 
the Security Council refer its case to the ICC, request that the Security 
Council authorize the creation of an ad hoc war crimes tribunal, or create its 
own national tribunal to try those accused of war crimes, etc. Yet, it is un-
clear which action, if any, would be successful. 
While the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over Russian war 
crimes,179 its jurisdiction is limited to events taking place after July 1, 
2002.180 The ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes “in particular when 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission 
of such crimes.”181 The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes that took place 
176 See Nowrojee, supra note 167, at 130. 
177 Monthly Forecast, January 2006, supra note 68.
178 Id.
179 See SCHABAS, supra note 108, at 56. 
180 Id.; see generally, Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
181 SCHABAS, supra note 108, at 56. 
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within the territory of member States, and where the nationals of Member 
states commit crimes no matter where the crime is committed.   
In March 2003, Paata Davitaia, the former Minister of Justice in 
Abkhazia (pro-Georgian), submitted a “communication” to the ICC alleging 
that the Abkhazian government administered a regime of ethnic cleansing 
against ethnic Georgians.182 Because of the great Russian involvement in 
the conflict, it is likely that Russia and individual Russians were also impli-
cated in the communication. Davitaia, however, communicated with the 
ICC as an ordinary citizen, not on behalf of the Georgian government. Upon 
receipt of the communication, the Prosecutor was required to “analyze the 
information to determine whether there was a basis to launch an investiga-
tion.”183 The Prosecutor’s office is unable to initiate an investigation unless 
it concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed184 and it obtains the 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization. In August 2004, the Prosecutor’s office 
stated that it had not decided to investigate the alleged crimes committed in 
Abkhazia and pointed out that the ICC “is a tool of last instance that may 
act only when states are unwilling or unable to investigate crimes.”185 The 
Prosecutor appeared to require exhaustion of domestic remedies. Neverthe-
less, this refusal does not entirely close the matter; the Prosecutor may in-
itiate an investigation based on the presentation of new facts or informa-
tion.186
Georgia, itself a party to the ICC,187 may consider complaining 
against Abkhazia and Russia in the ICC. In deciding whether to investigate 
Georgia’s communication, the Prosecutor’s analysis will be similar to the 
analysis of Davitaia’s communication. Georgia’s communication may, 
however, carry greater weight as:  
182 Abkhazia: The International Criminal Court looks at Georgian “Genocide,”
UNREPRESENTED NATIONS & PEOPLES ORG., July 20, 2004, http://www.unpo.org/article.php 
?id=942. 
183 The Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Ct., Update on Communications Received by the 
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Feb. 10, 2006, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_Update_on_Communications_10_February_2006.pdf.  
184 Id. at n. 1. In order to institute an investigation, the Prosecutor must evaluate whether a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed, gravity of the crimes, com-
plementarity with national proceedings, and interests of justice. See id.
185 ICC: No Decision Yet on Abkhazian War Crimes, UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN 
GEORGIA, Aug. 6, 2005, http://www.unomig.org/media/headlines/?id=1656&y=2004&m= 
8&d=6.
186 Rome Statute, supra note 180, at § 4. 
187 Id. at p. 160; see also International Criminal Court: Georgia, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties/country&id=94.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2007) (On 
July 18, 1998 Georgia became a signatory to and on Sept. 5, 2003, ratified the Rome Sta-
tute.). 
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Where the Prosecutor receives a referral from the State in which a crime 
has been committed, the Prosecutor has the advantage of knowing that that 
State has the political will to provide his Office with all the cooperation 
within the country that it is required to give under the Statute. Because the 
State, of its own volition, has requested the exercise of the Court’s juris-
diction, the Prosecutor can be confident that the national authorities will 
assist the investigation, will accord the privileges and immunities neces-
sary for the investigation, and will be anxious to provide if possible and 
appropriate the necessary level of protection to investigators and wit-
nesses.188
There are reports that Georgia has, in fact, communicated with the ICC. 
Such a communication would need to include sufficient documentation of 
Russian war crimes in order for the Prosecutor to pursue a case against Rus-
sia. Yet, the Prosecutor’s response to such communications is a matter of 
speculation at this time. The Prosecutor may again require the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies. Furthermore, Abkhaz officials say that if Georgia has 
communicated with the ICC, Abkhazia should have the right to communi-
cate with the ICC, a right it would otherwise not have because of its status 
as an unrecognized state.189 Accordingly, if Georgia has not communicated 
with the ICC, it may hesitate to do so if the ICC will investigate Abkhazian 
claims against Georgians and the Georgian government. Whether or not 
Georgia has officially communicated with the ICC, the Georgian govern-
ment should continue to collect information and evidence documenting Ab-
khazian and Russian crimes. 
A third option is for Georgia to request that the Security Council re-
fer the situation to the ICC. This is unlikely to occur as Russia holds one of 
the five permanent seats on the Security Council and has veto power. Russia 
is likely to veto a resolution referring the conflict to the ICC because it 
opens up the possibility that the Russian government, and Russian citizens 
engaged in the conflict, might be held criminally liable for their actions. 
In the alternative, Georgia could request the formation of an ad hoc
war crimes tribunal. Yet, the formation of an ad hoc tribunal requires Secu-
rity Council authorization. Once again, it is unlikely that the Security Coun-
cil would authorize the creation of an ad hoc tribunal as Russia holds one of 
the five permanent seats on the Security Council and the attendant veto 
power. While the Security Council acknowledged complaints that certain 
188 Office of the Prosecutor, Annex to the “Paper on some policy issues before the Office of 
the Prosecutor:” Referrals and Communications, INT’ CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/policy_annex_final_210404.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2007). 
189 Abkhazia to Seek Hague Probe into Alleged Georgian War Crimes, RUSS. & FSU GEN.
NEWS, Mar. 22, 2006, 2006 WLNR 4896519. Additionally, the “Abkhaz prosecutor's general 
office has collected materials from the past twelve years that enumerate” Georgian crimes in 
Abkhazia. Id.
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hostilities in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict amounted to ethnic cleansing 
and genocide and urged the formation of a joint investigation group,190 the 
Security Council resolution did not name Russia as an offender. Certainly, 
Russia would have exercised its veto power to prevent being named in con-
junction with accusations of ethnic cleansing and genocide. It is unclear 
whether a joint investigation group was, in fact, formed. Accordingly, the 
Security Council should authorize a group to investigate all accusations of 
ethnic cleansing, including those against Russian peacekeepers and other 
Russian nationals. It is likely, however, that Russia will veto any such reso-
lution. If that is the case, Georgia can seek a General Assembly resolution 
calling for the creation of an ad hoc war crimes tribunal. Unfortunately, 
such a resolution would be non-binding and purely symbolic. 
A final option is for Georgia to establish its own domestic tribunal 
in which to try those accused of war crimes. Such a tribunal, however, 
would likely face a great deal of criticism and create even more problems in 
Georgia, as Georgia’s legal system is notoriously corrupt and inept.191
Moreover, Georgia should not expect much help from the Abkhaz in inves-
tigating or prosecuting any suspected war criminals. Accordingly, Georgia 
has little in the way of meaningful recourse available against Russia’s viola-
tions of international law.
It appears that resolution of this issue rests with the Russians. Rus-
sia should promote justice by conducting investigations into complaints that 
certain actions of Russian citizens in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict have 
amounted to ethnic cleansing and try offenders in Russian courts. While this 
does not address the issue of the Russian government’s violations of inter-
national law, it might go a long way in healing the wounds of some of those 
injured in the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict. This, however, does not seem 
likely as Russia/Georgia tensions continue as they have for many years.192
VII. CONCLUSIONS
While the CIS peacekeeping force in Abkhazia is U.N.-sanctioned, 
Russian forces have violated international law, which undermines Russia’s 
190 UNOMIG Fact Finding Team, Oct. 7, 2005, United Nations Observer Mission in Geor-
gia, http://www.unomig.org/operations/fft/. 
191 DAVID L. PHILLIPS, STABILITY, SECURITY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE REPUBLIC OF 
GEORGIA 8 (2004), available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/
Georgia.pdf (explaining how Georgian courts are subject to political manipulation). 
192 See Anne Applebaum, What’s Going on in Abhazia, May 5, 2008, 
www.slate.com/id/2190651/ (Before last weekend, when the Russian press agency ITAR-
TASS declared that the government of Georgia was about to invade Abkhazia, nobody had 
really thought about Abkhazia at all. As a public service to readers who need a break from 
the U.S. election campaign, this column is therefore devoted to considering the possibility 
that Abkhazia could become the starting point of a larger war.). 
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credibility as a peacekeeper in Georgia. Furthermore, the Russian govern-
ment has engaged in practices such as the preferential distribution of pass-
ports to those of Abkhaz ethnicity, which seemingly undermines Russia’s 
alleged position of neutrality. The Georgia/Abkhazia conflict has dragged 
on for nearly sixteen years, without conditions suitable for the sizeable re-
turn of internally displaced persons to their homes or for a peaceful political 
settlement. While it is possible that Uzbek peacekeepers will replace the 
Russian peacekeepers,193 Russia should commit not to take unilateral meas-
ures.
The future of U.N. peacekeeping as a whole appears to lie with re-
gional organizations.194 While the United Nations values its peacekeeping 
partnerships with regional organizations (e.g., NATO, the European Union, 
the African Union, etc.), the partnership created between the United Nations 
and Russia in response to the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict has been unsuc-
cessful. The lack of success in this and other U.N. joint peacekeeping en-
deavors raises doubts about the efficacy of the current framework for U.N. 
joint peacekeeping. 
With “the potential for some 200 inter-ethnic conflicts as well as 
other conflicts in the former communist lands,” 195 the United Nations 
should develop a framework for joint peacekeeping missions with Russia, as 
the probability that Russia will engage in U.N. joint peacekeeping in the 
region is almost certain. The United Nations should begin to work with 
Russia now to ensure that when a new conflict arises, there is an existing 
framework allowing the partnership to quickly enter the region and effec-
tively work towards peace. Such a framework or agreement would require 
Russia to adhere to U.N. peacekeeping norms, provide for Russian accoun-
tability to the United Nations, and ensure that future joint peacekeeping 
operations actually result in peacekeeping as opposed to blatant violations 
of international law. 
193 See Georgia Considers Replacing Russian Peacekeepers with Ukrainians, RUSS. & CIS
MILITARY DAILY, Feb. 13, 2007, available at 2007 ULNR 2995957 (stating that Georgian 
Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili seeks to place Russian peacekeepers in Georgia with 
“more neutral, effective and result-oriented” peacekeepers). See generally Georgia to Re-
place Russian Peacekeepers—REGNUM Hot Issues, REGNUM NEWS AGENCY,
http://www.regnum.ru/englishdossier/33.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2007) (listing all 
REGNUM News Agency’s news stories covering Georgia’s replacement of Russian peace-
keepers). 
194 See Nowrojee, supra note 167, at 130. 
195 McNeill, supra note 3, at 111. 
